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ABSTRACT
According to Auditing Standard No. 14, fraud is an intentional act. Thus, when a
misstatement is identified during the audit, auditors should consider whether the
misstatement might have been caused intentionally (PCAOB 2010a). The objective of the
present study is to investigate whether considering the perspective of the manager
responsible for a misstatement’s occurrence impacts auditors’ beliefs concerning the
misstatement’s intentionality. Using an experiment with 82 audit manager and senior
manager participants, I find that auditors who actively consider the perspective of the
manager who caused a misstatement assess the likelihood that the misstatement is
intentional higher when the circumstances surrounding it are indicative of high versus
low fraud risk. Conversely, auditors who do not consider the manager’s perspective do
not assess misstatement intentionality any differently in the presence of high fraud risk
versus low fraud risk information. These findings suggest that the ability to recognize
when client circumstances suggest an increased risk that a misstatement was caused
intentionally may depend on whether auditors consider the perspective of the manager
responsible for the misstatement.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
When a misstatement is identified during the audit, auditors are responsible for
evaluating whether it is indicative of fraud (Auditing Standard No. 14 – PCAOB 2010a).
The primary characteristic that differentiates a fraudulent misstatement from an error is
whether the underlying action that resulted in the misstatement was intentional or
unintentional (AICPA 2002). If a misstatement’s intentionality hinges on the intent of the
individual(s) who caused it, then it is important that auditors are sensitive to fraud risk
factors specifically related to those responsible individuals. Although evaluating a
manager’s intent might be difficult (AICPA 2002; PCAOB 2007), a good starting point is
to consider the incentives and opportunities of the manager responsible for a
misstatement’s occurrence.1 The objective of the present study is to investigate how the
use of perspective taking impacts auditors’ assessments of a misstatement’s
intentionality.2 According to psychology theory, evaluating a misstatement from the
perspective

of

the

manager

who

caused

it

should

increase

auditors’

1

When evaluating the potential for fraud, the auditing standards recommend that auditors consider whether
client conditions provide management with an incentive, opportunity, or the ability to rationalize a
fraudulent act, which is referred to as the fraud triangle (AICPA 2002; PCAOB 2010b). Wolfe and
Hermanson (2004) argue that a fourth element, capability, should be added to make a “fraud diamond.”
When a manager has knowledge of a business process and/or access to influence transactions, the ability to
perpetrate fraud is increased (Wolfe and Hermanson 2004). Thus, the ability of a manager to cause a
misstatement should be considered a fraud red flag.
2

Perspective taking is a type of mental simulation in which an individual imagines himself in another
individual’s shoes and considers his own thoughts and actions under the circumstances facing another
individual (Batson 2009; Davis et al. 1996; Coutu 1951; Epley and Caruso 2009).

1

attention to the circumstances surrounding the misstatement and how they might have
influenced a manager’s intentions to misstate (e.g., Regan and Totten 1975; Ross and
Nisbett 1991).
Considering whether misstatements might be intentional is an important aspect of
fraud detection, as evidenced by its explicit inclusion in AS No. 14 (PCAOB 2010a).
Although fraud is often thought of as (and often may be) a multimillion dollar scheme
involving the top members of management (Beasley, Carcello, and Hermanson 2010),
intentional misstatements may also occur on a smaller scale. An intentional misstatement,
even if it does not clearly exceed materiality, calls into question the integrity of
management and should lead to a number of responses required by the auditing standards
(PCAOB 2010a).3 In fact, even believing that a misstatement might be intentional should
prompt auditors to discuss concerns with client management and/or the audit committee
and investigate the misstatement further to determine if fraud has in fact occurred
(PCAOB 2010a). Recent PCAOB reports, however, indicate that auditors do not
investigate whether misstatements are indicative of fraud when perhaps they should
(PCAOB 2007), which suggests that additional improvements (and additional research)
are needed within this important area of fraud detection. In a recent Practice Alert, the
PCAOB stressed the importance of applying professional skepticism throughout the
course of the audit and discouraged auditors from dismissing identified misstatements as
immaterial without first giving them adequate consideration (PCAOB 2012).
3

According to AS No. 14, if auditors believe that a misstatement is or might be intentional, they should
evaluate the implications on the integrity of management and the assessment of fraud risk as well as
consider whether additional audit evidence might be necessary to determine if fraud has occurred (PCAOB
2010a). Furthermore, SAB No. 99 states that an intentional misstatement, regardless of magnitude, may be
considered an “illegal act” under federal securities law, and illegal acts must be reported to the audit
committee (SEC 1999). Finally, believing that a misstatement might be intentional should influence
auditors’ materiality judgments (SEC 1999).

2

Previous studies in the auditing literature related to improving fraud detection
have primarily focused on the planning phase of the audit (e.g., Asare and Wright 2004;
Wilks and Zimbelman 2004; Carpenter 2007; Hoffman and Zimbelman 2009; Simon
2012). However, evaluating whether an identified misstatement might be intentional
involves a somewhat different evaluation process than what is typically employed during
fraud planning judgments. Evaluating the cause of an identified misstatement requires a
backwards, explanatory evaluation process in which auditors attempt to determine a
cause (fraud or error) of an observed event (misstatement). Furthermore, understanding
how a misstatement came about often involves the consideration of a specific client
action that occurred under a specific set of circumstances.
There is evidence within the psychology literature that an evaluation involving (1)
a backwards inference process and/or (2) the understanding of a specific action under a
specific set of circumstances results in a tendency to ignore the role of existing
circumstances in influencing behavior (e.g., Jones and Nisbett 1971; Einhorn and
Hogarth 1986; Gilbert 2002). A failure to consider how client circumstances might have
influenced a manager’s actions is likely to make it difficult for auditors to determine if a
misstatement was caused intentionally.
In an effort to detect fraud, it is important to consider the existence of client
circumstances that make the perpetration of fraud more desirable (i.e., an incentive) or
easier to perpetrate and conceal (i.e., an opportunity) (PCAOB 2010a). According to
psychology theory, evaluating another individual’s actions from that person’s point of
view fosters an increased understanding of how existing circumstances might have
influenced behavior (e.g., Regan and Totten 1975; Ross and Nisbett 1991; Eyal et al.

3

2008). By considering the perspective of the manager responsible for a misstatement, I
expect that auditors will recognize the existence of fraud risk factors that may have
provided the manager with an incentive and opportunity to intentionally misstate. Thus,
when the circumstances surrounding a misstatement are indicative of high fraud risk,
auditors who engage in perspective taking will be more likely to believe that the
misstatement was caused intentionally and investigate further.
Using an experiment, I examine whether considering the perspective of the
manager responsible for a misstatement affects auditors’ assessments of a misstatement’s
intentionality. My study manipulates the fraud risk factors surrounding an identified
misstatement to be indicative of a higher or lower risk of fraud. I attempt to manipulate
perspective taking by instructing some auditors to imagine themselves in the shoes of the
manager responsible for the misstatement. I also use a measured variable to capture the
extent to which auditors actively considered the perspective of the manager. Both the
manipulation and the measured variable are common ways of testing perspective taking
in the psychology literature (Davis et al. 1996; Galinsky and Moskowitz 2000; Mallett et
al. 2008).
I find that while the manipulated variable did not appear to induce perspective
taking, the measured variable shows that auditors who actively considered the manager’s
perspective were more sensitive to the fraud risk factors surrounding the misstatement
compared to auditors who did not use perspective taking.4 When the fraud risk factors
surrounding the misstatement were indicative of high risk, auditors who actively
considered the manager’s perspective assessed the misstatement as significantly more

4

The effects of perspective taking were obtained after controlling for participant effort and experience.

4

likely to be intentional compared to auditors who did not use perspective taking.
Interestingly, the auditors who did not consider the manager’s perspective assessed the
misstatement’s intentionality the same in both the high fraud risk and the low fraud risk
condition. Thus, it would appear that the ability to recognize when client circumstances
suggest an increased risk that a misstatement was caused intentionally may depend on
whether auditors consider the perspective of the manager responsible for the
misstatement.
The present study contributes to the audit literature and to audit practice in a
number of important ways. First, I provide evidence concerning the type of reasoning
process that may help auditors assess the risk that an identified misstatement was caused
intentionally. Perspective taking presumably provides auditors with insight into whether a
manager was likely to have perceived misstating to be personally beneficial (an
incentive) and reasonably easy to perpetrate and conceal (an opportunity). It is possible
that while misstating the financial statements might not help management in general to
meet a bonus target or analyst earnings target, it may nonetheless increase the
compensation or performance evaluation of an individual manager. Thus, in addition to
considering fraud risks at the company level, auditors also should consider fraud risks
that are specific to an operating location or individual manager (AICPA 2002; Carcello
and Hermanson 2008). My study provides insight into the type of reasoning process that
may be helpful when seeking to understand the intentions of an individual manager.
Second, my study responds to the PCAOB’s concerns that auditors are not
displaying sufficient professional skepticism at the point in which a misstatement is
identified (PCAOB 2007). Believing that a misstatement is immaterial does not excuse

5

auditors from applying a sufficient level of professional skepticism, including
considering whether the misstatement might be intentional (PCAOB 2010a; PCAOB
2012). The results of my study suggest that auditors are more skeptical of an identified
misstatement (i.e., believe that it is more likely to be intentional) when surrounding
circumstances are indicative of high versus low fraud risk, but only when they consider
the manager’s perspective. Because one’s ability to successfully take the perspective of
another is believed to be improved through direct experience (Iannotti 1978; Chalmers
and Townsend 1990), audit firms may want to consider integrating perspective taking
tasks into future firm trainings.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the related
literature and develops my hypotheses. The methodology and results are described in
Chapter 3 and 4, respectively. Finally, Chapter 5 provides the conclusions and limitations
of the study.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
2.1 EVALUATING MISSTATEMENT INTENTIONALITY AND ATTENTION TO FRAUD RISKS
Most of the fraud detection literature to date has focused on the planning phase of
the audit (see Hammersley 2011 for an extensive review of the fraud planning literature).
The auditing standards require the performance of various fraud planning procedures
(e.g., fraud risk assessments, brainstorming sessions); thus, fraud should be a primary
focus for auditors during the planning phase of the audit (Braun 2000). Hammersley
(2011) concludes in her review of the fraud planning literature that auditors generally are
sensitive to the presence of fraud risk factors when planning the audit. However, the
planning phase of the audit is not the only point at which fraud should be considered.
Auditors should be sensitive to fraud risks during all stages of the audit (AICPA 2002;
PCAOB 2010a).
One point at which auditors should specifically consider the potential for fraud is
upon identifying a misstatement within the financial statements. When a misstatement is
identified, auditors should consider whether the misstatement is indicative of fraud
(PCAOB 2010a). No study of which I am aware provides direct evidence of auditors’
sensitivity to fraud risk factors when evaluating the cause of an identified misstatement.
However, there is some evidence that auditors are not always sensitive to the presence of
fraud during later stages of the audit. Prior studies suggest that auditors’ sensitivity to
fraud during evidence evaluation may be lower when auditing an account assessed as
7

having a low risk of misstatement (Phillips 1999) or when the documentation of fraud
risks during the planning phase lacks sufficient detail (Hammersley et al. 2010). Braun
(2000) reports that during the performance of testing procedures, auditors generally are
not sensitive to qualitative information indicative of fraud, particularly when they are
placed under time pressure. Braun (2000) concludes that unlike the planning phase of the
audit where fraud is a primary focus, during later stages of the audit, fraud becomes a
secondary task.
In recent years, the importance placed on fraud detection has increased
substantially (AICPA 2002; PCAOB 2010a, 2010b). Thus, it is possible that auditors are
sensitive to information indicative of fraud when evaluating identified misstatements.
However, PCAOB inspection reports have documented multiple instances in which
auditors have failed to investigate whether departures from GAAP were indicative of
fraud, suggesting that auditors are not applying sufficient levels of professional
skepticism when misstatements are identified (PCAOB 2007). Due to the high frequency
of misstatements encountered by auditors during their careers that are due to error rather
than fraud, auditors are likely to believe that most identified misstatements are
unintentional (Libby 1985; Loebbecke et al. 1989). If auditors are too quick to conclude
that an identified misstatement is unintentional, they may fail to recognize when the
circumstances surrounding a misstatement are indicative of high fraud risk.
The psychology literature suggests that there are two characteristics associated
with the process evaluating a misstatement that may naturally result in a general
insensitivity to fraud risk factors. First, evaluating a misstatement for evidence of fraud
involves a backwards inference process. A backwards inference is one in which an

8

outcome is known (e.g., a known misstatement is identified) and a cause must be inferred
(e.g., error or fraud) (O’Donnell 2004; Koonce et al. 2011). During backwards inferences,
attention is divided between the various causes that might explain an outcome, rather than
focusing on the circumstances that make one particular cause more likely (Schustack and
Sternberg 1981; Einhorn and Hogarth 1986; Waller and Felix 1989). When applied to the
evaluation of an identified misstatement, this suggests that rather than focusing
exclusively on the presence of fraud risk factors (i.e., the circumstances that make fraud a
more likely cause), auditors’ attention will be divided between fraud and error as
potential causes.5 While considering the potential for fraud and error simultaneously is
not necessarily improper, it does suggest that auditors will be less sensitive to information
indicative of fraud than they would be if they were considering fraud in isolation.
Second, assessing whether a misstatement might be intentional often involves the
evaluation of a specific client action performed under a specific set of circumstances.
Many studies in psychology have reported that in an effort to make sense of (or attribute
a cause to) another individual’s actions, there is a tendency to ignore the role of the
situation in influencing behavior (e.g., Jones and Nisbett 1971; Galper 1976; Gilbert
2002). Instead, these studies find that people tend to attribute the actions of others to their
stable dispositional traits.6 Thus, when auditors evaluate an identified misstatement, the

5

Conversely, fraud planning procedures involve a forward inference process in which auditors reason
about fraud in a forward, predictive manner. During forward inferences, a particular cause (e.g., fraud) is
typically considered in isolation along with the circumstances that make that cause more likely to result in
an outcome (e.g., misstatement) (Einhorn and Hogarth 1986; Waller and Felix 1989). Thus, during fraud
planning procedures, auditors’ attention is likely focused primarily on fraud and the existence of fraud risk
factors (Braun 2000; Hammersley 2011).
6

A dispositional trait is a stable characteristic of one’s personality. However, people do not always act in
ways that are consistent with their dispositions. As the time for action draws near, individuals are
influenced less by their dispositions and more by whether the immediate circumstances enable or constrain
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psychology literature suggests that they will not consider how existing circumstances
might have influenced a manager to intentionally misstate the financial statements. For
example, an auditor may attribute an identified misstatement to a manager’s
incompetence (a disposition), thus concluding it to be unintentional, and fail to recognize
that the manager’s compensation or performance evaluation criteria provided him with an
incentive to intentionally misstate.
2.2 PERSPECTIVE TAKING
The psychology literature suggests that a greater understanding of how existing
circumstances might have influenced another’s behavior is achieved by considering the
individual’s point of view (i.e., perspective taking). Perspective taking is a type of mental
simulation in which an individual imagines himself in another’s place and considers his
own thoughts and actions under the circumstances facing another individual (Coutu 1951;
Davis et al. 1996; Batson 2009; Epley and Caruso 2009). Perspective taking has been
used in a variety of contexts in psychology as a method for improving interpersonal
understanding and is theorized to provide insight into another individual’s thoughts and
feelings (e.g., Piaget 1932; Galinsky and Moskowitz 2000).7
Prior studies in auditing have found that actually stepping into the shoes of the
client via role playing can lead to improved negotiation outcomes and financial reporting
quality (Trotman et al. 2005; Peytcheva et al. 2012). Role playing involves actively
playing out the role of another individual (Coutu 1951). Trotman et al. (2005) find that

behavior (Eyal et al. 2009). Thus, even generally honest managers might commit fraud if the circumstances
make it appear advantageous and feasible (AICPA 2002; Carpenter and Reimers 2005).
7

According to Hurtt (2010), interpersonal understanding is one of the primary components of professional
skepticism and consists of understanding the motivations and perceptions of individual managers.
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auditors who played the role of the client during a mock negotiation subsequently
negotiated larger write-downs during the actual negotiation with the client compared to
auditors receiving other negotiation interventions. Peytcheva et al. (2012) had studentparticipants interact strategically as auditors and managers in a laboratory experiment and
found that auditors who had been assigned a manager role in a previous round were more
accurate in discerning true earnings from a manager’s reported earnings compared to
auditors who had not experienced a manager role. The improvements in negotiation
outcomes and financial reporting quality reported in these studies presumably occur as a
result of obtaining a better understanding of the client’s perspective.8
One of the most studied benefits of perspective taking is its ability to foster an
increased understanding of the situation facing another individual (e.g., Regan and Totten
1975; Galinsky and Moskowitz 2000). In fact, perspective taking is described in the
psychology literature as “the active consideration of another’s point of view and the
situation that person faces” (Galinsky 2002, p. 97). Although people often ignore the role
of the situation in influencing the behavior of others, this appears to be a function of
perspective. When asked to explain the actions of an individual from an observer’s (i.e.,
third-person) point of view, psychology studies report that people attribute the
individual’s behavior to dispositional traits, with very little attention given to the

8

Prior studies have used strategic reasoning, the consideration of management’s potential motives and
actions, as a method to improve auditors’ fraud detection procedures (Hoffman and Zimbelman 2009;
Bowlin 2011; Simon 2012). Strategic reasoning is derived from game theory and is used to anticipate the
hypothetical actions of an opponent (Zimbelman and Waller 1999). Thus, strategic reasoning is useful
during the planning phase of the audit to anticipate where and how management might hypothetically enact
fraud. Once a misstatement is identified, however, anticipating a client’s action is no longer necessary. At
this point, auditors require a reasoning process that can aid in the understanding of an already enacted
behavior. The psychology literature suggests that evaluating another individual’s behavior from the
“actor’s” point of view (i.e., perspective taking) leads to a greater understanding of the behavior and the
circumstances within which the behavior was enacted (Ross and Nisbett 1991; Galinsky 2002; Eyal et al.
2008; Batson 2009).
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circumstances surrounding the behavior (e.g., Jones and Nisbett 1971; Galper 1976;
Gilbert 2002). By prompting participants to consider and explain another’s actions from
the actor’s point of view (i.e., a first-person perspective), explanations become more
focused on the situation and how existing circumstances might have influenced behavior
(Regan and Totten 1975; Galper 1976; Eyal et al. 2008).
The psychology literature suggests that when auditors use their natural, thirdperson perspective to assess the risk that a misstatement was caused intentionally, they
will be relatively insensitive to the circumstances surrounding the misstatement and their
fraud implications (Jones and Nisbett 1971; Gilbert 2002). Conversely, considering the
perspective of the manager responsible for the misstatement (i.e., the actor’s point of
view) will increase auditors’ attention to fraud risk factors and the understanding of how
these factors might have influenced the manager’s intentions to misstate (Regan and
Totten 1975; Eyal et al. 2008; Epley and Caruso 2009). Thus, I expect that when the
circumstances surrounding a misstatement are indicative of higher fraud risk (i.e., the
manager responsible for the misstatement has a direct incentive and opportunity to
misstate), auditors who engage in perspective taking will assess misstatement
intentionality higher than auditors who do not engage in perspective taking. Conversely,
when the circumstances surrounding a misstatement are indicative of lower fraud risk,
auditors who engage in perspective taking are expected to assess misstatement
intentionality lower than auditors who do not engage in perspective taking. Stated
formally, my first hypothesis is as follows:
H1: When the circumstances surrounding an identified misstatement are
indicative of higher (lower) fraud risk, auditors who engage in perspective
taking will assess the likelihood that the misstatement is intentional higher
(lower) than auditors who do not engage in perspective taking.
12

The expected interaction is depicted in Panel A of Figure 2.1. Without the use of
perspective taking, auditors are expected to fail to recognize the risk of fraud indicated by
the circumstances surrounding an identified misstatement. Auditors who engage in
perspective taking, however, will recognize the higher (lower) risk indicated by the
circumstances surrounding the misstatement and will assess misstatement intentionality
higher (lower) in accordance with the fraud risk factors that are present.9
The psychology literature suggests that perspective taking results in (1) increased
attention to the circumstances that might have influenced another’s behavior (e.g., Regan
and Totten 1975) and (2) a greater understanding of how an individual might have
perceived or interpreted these circumstances (Ross and Nisbett 1991). The following
hypotheses are intended to provide support for the perspective taking mechanism in terms
of how it is expected to influence auditors’ assessments of misstatement intentionality.
As previously discussed, perspective taking has been found to result in a greater
sensitivity to the role of the situation in influencing the behavior of others (Regan and
Totten 1975; Galper 1976; Eyal et al. 2008). Studies that have examined the effect of
shifting perspectives have asked participants to explain an action either from their own
observer’s perspective or instead by imagining themselves in the actor’s shoes (Regan
and Totten 1975; Galper 1976). These studies find that explanations provided from an
actor’s point of view focus to a greater extent on the surrounding circumstances and how
these circumstances might have influenced the action being described.

9

I note that it is possible that, due to a floor effect, there may be no difference between the misstatement
intentionality assessments of auditors in the lower risk condition, regardless of engagement in perspective
taking. This might be the case if auditors always maintain a certain level of skepticism when a
misstatement is identified. Thus, the low risk line in Figure 2.1 might be flat rather than slanted downward.
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Consistent with studies in psychology, I expect that auditors who evaluate a
misstatement from the perspective of the manager who caused it will be more sensitive to
circumstances that might have influenced the manager to intentionally misstate.
Specifically, I expect these auditors to focus their attention on the fraud risk factors that
provide the manager with a direct incentive and opportunity for fraud.10 Thus, when
asked to describe the factors considered while evaluating misstatement intentionality,
auditors who engage in perspective taking are expected to include a greater number of
factors that provide the manager with a direct incentive and opportunity to intentionally
misstate. Stated formally, my second hypothesis is as follows:
H2: Auditors who engage in perspective taking will list a greater number
of fraud risk factors that provide the manager with a direct incentive and
opportunity to intentionally misstate compared to auditors who do not
engage in perspective taking.
Perspective taking provides insight into how another individual might perceive
and interpret his or her surroundings (e.g., Jones and Nisbett 1971, Ross and Nisbett
1991). It is the perceived desirability and feasibility of an action that causes an individual
to form a behavioral intention (e.g., Ajzen 1985, 1991). Thus, when a manager perceives
fraud to be both personally beneficial (i.e., an incentive) and relatively easy to perpetrate
and conceal (i.e., an opportunity), the manager is more likely to form fraudulent
intentions and engage in a fraudulent act.11

10

Although considering all fraud risk factors is important, the present study is most interested in how
auditors evaluate whether a specific client action was intentional. Psychology theory related to the
formation of intentions, would suggest that the circumstances that are most salient to a manager at a given
point in time will have the greatest influence on his behavioral intentions (Ajzen 1985, 1991; Eyal et al.
2008). I expect that factors that provide a manager with a direct incentive to misstate and a direct
opportunity to do so will be more salient, and thus more influential, than more distal factors.
11

The ability to rationalize a fraudulent act is the third element of the fraud triangle (PCAOB 2010a).
Because my theory relates to the use of perspective taking to understand how the situation influences
another’s behavior, I focus exclusively on incentives and opportunities, which are the elements most related
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According to SAS No. 99, a manager is more likely to commit a fraudulent act
when client circumstances impose a sufficient amount of pressure (AICPA 2002). To
recognize when a set of circumstances impose a “sufficient amount of pressure,” and
provide a sufficient opportunity for fraud, auditors should consider the manager’s
interpretation of the situation (Ross and Nisbett 1991). Perspective taking provides
insight into how another individual might perceive a set of circumstances. Thus, I
propose that auditors who engage in perspective taking will recognize the extent to which
the circumstances surrounding a misstatement provide the manager with an incentive and
opportunity for fraud. Stated formally, my final hypotheses are as follows:
H3a: When the circumstances surrounding a misstatement are indicative
of higher (lower) fraud risk, auditors who engage in perspective taking
will assess the manager’s incentive for fraud higher (lower) than auditors
who do not engage in perspective taking.
H3b: When the circumstances surrounding a misstatement are indicative
of higher (lower) fraud risk, auditors who engage in perspective taking
will assess the manager’s opportunity for fraud higher (lower) than
auditors who do not engage in perspective taking.

to client circumstances, whereas rationalization is how the individual justifies what he/she is going to do or
has done.

15

Misstatement Intentionality Assessment

PANEL A: Expected Interaction – H1

Fraud Risk:
High Risk
Low Risk

Absent

Present

Perspective Taking

PANEL B: Results – H1
Misstatement Intentionality Assessment

10
9
8
7
6

Fraud Risk:

5

High Risk
Low Risk

4
3
2
1
0
Low

High

Perspective Taking Engagement
FIGURE 2.1 The figures above depict the expected (Panel A) and resulting (Panel B)
interaction of fraud risk and perspective taking on auditors’ assessments of a
misstatement’s intentionality.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
3.1 PARTICIPANTS AND STUDY ADMINISTRATION
Participants were provided through a grant from the Center for Audit Quality and
included 82 auditors from the Big 4 public accounting firms, consisting of 25 managers,
56 senior managers and one partner. Participants had a combined average of 9.6 years of
audit experience. Through discussions with audit practitioners, it was determined that
evaluating whether identified misstatements might be intentional is typically performed
by auditors with this level of experience. Sixty-three participants accessed the experiment
online using Qualtrics software and the remaining 19 participants completed the study in
paper-based format. There were no differences in responses based on firm or medium of
study administration.
3.2 CASE MATERIALS AND PROCEDURES
I created case materials in consultation with an audit partner from a Big 4 firm.
The case materials were then reviewed by three additional audit partners. Finally, the
case was pilot tested with 21 audit managers and senior managers. I revised the case
based on partner feedback and pilot test results in an attempt to increase the
understandability of the case and adjust the strength of the manipulations.
Participants were provided with case materials related to a hypothetical year-end
audit engagement and were asked to evaluate a misstatement identified by the audit team.
Participants were provided with an excerpt from the audit program that included
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instructions for evaluating identified misstatements. In addition to obtaining an
understanding of the nature and cause of each misstatement and evaluating materiality,
all participants were told to “consider whether each misstatement is or might be
intentional,” consistent with the wording of AS No. 14 (PCAOB 2010a). The audit
program instructions contained the manipulation of perspective taking, as will be
described in the next section. Participants were asked to verify their understanding of the
audit program instructions by initialing next to each step.
After viewing the audit program instructions, participants received information
related to the identified misstatement, including the circumstances contributing to its
occurrence and the manager responsible. All participants received an explanation from
client management that the misstatement had resulted from an unintentional classification
error. Included within the case information were the manipulated fraud risk factors as
well as information about the quantitative and qualitative materiality of the misstatement.
The materiality information indicated that the misstatement was below all quantitative
benchmarks and did not allow the company to meet a bonus target or analyst earnings
target and did not mask a change in earnings or other trends.
After participants finished reviewing the case information, they were asked to
evaluate the likelihood that the misstatement is or might be intentional. Participants then
described the facts that they considered when evaluating whether the misstatement was
intentional, assessed the extent to which the manager responsible had an incentive and
opportunity for fraud, indicated follow-up procedures, and answered demographic and
manipulation check questions.
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3.3 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
The study uses a 2x2 between subjects design in which perspective taking and
fraud risk are manipulated. Additionally, the data is analyzed using a measure of
perspective taking in place of the manipulated variable. Perspective taking has been
analyzed in psychology studies by manipulating perspective taking via instructions (e.g.,
Davis et al. 1996; Galinsky and Moskowitz 2000), measuring individuals’ dispositional
perspective taking ability via self-report (e.g., Davis 1983), or by measuring actual
engagement in perspective taking using open-ended responses (e.g., McPherson Frantz
and Janoff-Bulman 2000; Mallett et al. 2008). The present study employs two of these
methods – a perspective taking manipulation, which could be easily integrated into audit
work programs, and a perspective taking measure, which is intended to capture the extent
to which auditors actively took the perspective of the client manager. Both manipulated
variables (fraud risk and perspective taking) and the measured perspective taking variable
are described in this section.
3.3.1 FRAUD RISK MANIPULATION
Fraud risk was manipulated by varying four pieces of information directly related
to the manager responsible for the misstatement and the action leading to the
misstatement. In this way, the fraud risk surrounding the misstatement’s occurrence was
high or low, while general company information remained consistent between conditions.
The four pieces of information that were manipulated included two fraud risk factors that
varied the extent to which the manager responsible for the misstatement directly
benefited from its occurrence (i.e., an incentive for the manager to intentionally misstate).
The remaining two fraud risk factors varied the perceived ease or difficulty with which
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the manager could have perpetrated and concealed the misstatement (i.e., an opportunity
for the manager to intentionally misstate). See the Appendix for the full manipulations. I
obtained verification from an audit partner that each of the high fraud risk factors did in
fact increase the risk that the misstatement might be intentional. Additionally, the audit
partner verified that the manipulations within the low risk condition successfully reduced
the risk that the misstatement was intentional.
3.3.2 PERSPECTIVE TAKING MANIPULATION
Perspective taking is manipulated via the presence or absence of perspective
taking instructions included within the audit program (PT Instructions-Present vs. PT
Instructions-Absent). In all conditions, the audit program instructs participants to evaluate
whether each misstatement is or might be intentional. Participants in the PT InstructionsPresent condition are told to evaluate the facts and circumstances related to the
misstatement using the following evaluation process: “Think from the perspective of the
client-individual responsible for the misstatement. Put yourself in the place of this clientindividual and try to imagine what you would think and how you would feel…”12
Conversely, participants in the PT Instructions-Absent condition are told to evaluate the
facts and circumstances “as you normally would in practice” (see the Appendix for the
full manipulations).
3.3.3 PERSPECTIVE TAKING MEASURE
Studies in psychology suggest that perspective taking is an effortful process,
which can be inhibited when there are high demands on one’s cognitive resources (e.g.,

12

The wording of the perspective taking manipulation is consistent with perspective taking studies in
psychology, which instruct participants to imagine themselves in another’s shoes and consider their own
thoughts and feelings under the circumstances facing another (e.g., Davis et al. 1996; Galinsky and
Moskowitz 2000; Mallet et al. 2008)
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Davis et al. 1996). Conversely, other studies have reported that some individuals
naturally (i.e., spontaneously) engage in perspective taking even when not explicitly told
to do so (e.g., Leith and Baumeister 1998; Mallett et al. 2008). Thus, it is possible that
some auditors will fail to consider a manager’s perspective when instructed to do so
and/or will naturally consider the manager’s perspective even when they do not receive
perspective taking instructions. To deal with the potential difficulties of manipulating
perspective taking, prior studies have captured the degree to which participants
considered another’s perspective by coding their open-ended responses based on
references to another’s perspective, interpretation, thoughts, beliefs, feelings, wants
and/or desires (e.g., Leith and Baumeister 1998; McPherson, Frants and Janoff-Bulman
2000; Mallett et al. 2008) Coding of open-ended responses has been used within the
audit literature to capture auditors’ mental states, including problem representations and
mental simulations (e.g., Hammersley 2006; Trotman et al. 2009). Because I am most
interested in the effects of actively taking on the perspective of a client manager (i.e.,
simulating a manager’s perspective), I construct a measure of perspective taking
engagement that is based on similar measures used within the psychology and audit
literature.
To construct the perspective taking engagement measure, I analyzed participants’
responses to a question asking them to explain the factors they considered while
evaluating whether the misstatement might be intentional. Two coders (the author and a
doctoral student with auditing experience) worked independently to code participant
responses. Each participant was assigned a generic participant number, so that both
coders were blind to the participant’s experimental condition during the coding process
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and the doctoral student coder was blind to the hypotheses. A dichotomous coding
scheme was used so that each response was either coded as (1) high in perspective taking
engagement (High PT Engagement) or (2) low in perspective taking engagement (Low
PT Engagement).13
The measure of perspective taking engagement is based on whether participants
documented that they had considered the perspective of the manager responsible for the
misstatement while evaluating the misstatement’s intentionality. Consistent with the
definition of perspective taking within the psychology literature and consistent with
studies that have measured perspective taking using open-ended responses, participants
were coded as High in PT Engagement if they made one or more references to the
manager’s perspective, interpretation, thoughts, beliefs, feelings, wants, and/or desires.
Responses that did not include reference to the manager’s perspective, thoughts, feelings,
etc. were coded as Low in PT Engagement. See Figure 3.1 for examples of responses
coded as High versus Low in PT Engagement. Forty-two of the 82 participants (51.2%)
were coded as High in PT Engagement, while the remaining 40 (48.8%) participants were
coded as Low in PT Engagement. Inter-rater agreement is 89.0 percent. Cohen’s Kappa, a
measure of agreement over and above that expected by random agreement, is 0.78.
Generally, Kappa values of .60 - .70 are considered to reflect a substantial level of
agreement (Landis and Koch 1977; Fleiss 1981). All coding differences were mutually
resolved.

13

A dichotomous measure was chosen so that results could be easily shown in graphical format.
Additionally, this allows the perspective taking measure to be easily compared to the manipulation of
perspective taking, which has two levels (present versus absent).
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3.4 DEPENDENT VARIABLES
Four dependent measures are used to test my hypotheses: misstatement
intentionality assessments, attention to manager-specific fraud risk factors, and incentive
and opportunity assessments. Participants’ assessments of misstatement intentionality
(used to test H1) were elicited by asking participants the likelihood that the identified
misstatement is or might be intentional on an 11-point scale with endpoints labeled “0 –
NOT at all Likely” and “10 – VERY Likely”.
To measure auditors’ attention to manager-specific fraud risk factors (used to test
H2), I asked participants to list facts from the case that they considered while evaluating
whether the misstatement might be intentional. Because I expect perspective taking to
focus auditors’ attention on circumstances that might have influenced a specific
manager’s intentions to misstate, I used the number of manager-specific fraud risk factors
listed by participants as the dependent variable. The manager-specific fraud risk factors
include the four manipulated fraud risk factors (two related to the manager’s incentive to
misstate and two related to his opportunity to misstate) and two additional fraud risk
factors that were determined to be manager-specific, as they also related to the manager’s
incentive or opportunity.14 In testing H2, any reference made to a manager-specific fraud
risk factor is considered to provide evidence of attention, regardless of whether it is
discussed as increasing or decreasing the risk of fraud. Participants were not able to refer
back to the case while listing the factors they considered. The use of free recall to
measure attention is consistent with prior auditing literature (e.g., Tan 1995; Phillips
14

The two additional manager-specific fraud risk factors were (1) the fact that a supplier penalty had been
incurred as a result of the manager’s failure to purchase a certain level of product (an incentive to hide the
penalty) and (2) the fact that the manager had not submitted supporting documentation along with a
payment request (an opportunity to hide the misclassified expense). These two facts were the same in all
conditions.
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1999; Rose 2007). The same doctoral student coder and I worked independently to
identify the number of manager-specific fraud risk factors listed by each participant.
Inter-rater agreement is 86.6 percent and Cohen’s Kappa is .75, reflecting a substantial
level of agreement (Landis and Koch 1977; Fleiss 1981). All differences in coding were
mutually resolved.
Finally, incentive and opportunity assessments (used to test H3a and H3b,
respectively) measure the extent to which auditors believe the manager responsible for
the misstatement had an incentive and opportunity to intentionally misstate. I ask
participants to indicate the extent to which the manager had an incentive for fraud (i.e.,
how beneficial was it to the manager to intentionally misstate) on an 11-point scale
ranging from “0 – No Incentive (Not at all Beneficial)” to “10 – Strong Incentive (Very
Beneficial).” The extent to which the manager had an opportunity for fraud (i.e., how
difficult/easy was it for the manager to misstate) is measured on an 11-point scale ranging
from “0 – No Opportunity (Very Difficult)” to “10 – Strong Opportunity (Very Easy).”
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Case Fact being
Referred to in
Participant Response
Control Deficiency

Example of Participant Response Coded
Low vs. High in PT Engagement
Low in PT Engagement
High in PT Engagement
“The approval for payment “Control was not working
was made by someone who throughout the year due to
did not ordinarily perform
personnel
the review since the primary change...purchasing
reviewer was out of the
manager could have
office.”
realized that adequate
support didn’t need to be
sent.”
Responsibility for Initiation “Joe initiated the supply
“Since Joe had the
of Supply Agreement
agreement and was
responsibility to initiate
responsible for setting the
the contract and make
purchasing targets.”
purchases based on the
contract, he might not
want to be responsible for
an additional expense.”
Manager’s Performance
“Joe is evaluated…based on “From the employee’s
Evaluation Criteria
primary job responsibilities perspective, his rating…is
and operational
evaluated based on his
performance and
performance of duties and
profitability of his
an $800K + penalty
division.”
would not look good for
his performance.”
FIGURE 3.1 The table above provides examples of participant responses that were coded
as being High vs. Low in PT Engagement. Participant responses were elicited by asking
them to list the factors they considered when evaluating whether the misstatement might
be intentional. Italicized text within the High PT Engagement column points out the
participant’s reference to the manager’s perspective, interpretation, thoughts, feelings,
wants/desires that was considered by the coders to be an admission that the participant
had considered the manager’s perspective while evaluating the misstatement.
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS
4.1 PERSPECTIVE TAKING MANIPULATION CHECK
Participants responded to a manipulation check question that asked them to
indicate the instructions they had received regarding evaluating the misstatement. The
two choices were as follows: “as I normally would in practice” or “from the perspective
of Joe Rogers, Purchasing Manager (i.e., by imagining myself in the place of the clientindividual responsible for the misstatement).” Seventy-four of the 82 participants who
completed the study (90.2%) correctly identified the instructions they had received.
However, recalling the instructions received does not verify that participants actively
considered the manager’s perspective during their evaluations. Thus, a more precise way
of determining whether the perspective taking manipulation was successful is by using
the measure of PT Engagement, which indicates whether participants actually considered,
by their own admission, the manager’s perspective. I find that of the 42 participants who
received perspective taking instructions, 19 actively engaged in perspective taking (i.e.,
were coded as High in PT Engagement) (45.2%).15 Of the participants who did not
receive perspective taking instructions, 23 (57.5%) spontaneously considered the
perspective of the manager without being prompted.

15

Using a measure of perspective taking similar to the one used in the present study, Leith and Baumeister
(1998) find that 72% of their participants actively engaged in perspective taking after receiving instructions
to do so. The lower percentage found in my study may be due to the high cognitive demands of my task,
which can make perspective taking particularly difficult (Davis et al. 1996).
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Thus, I actually find that a higher percent of participants engaged in perspective
taking when they did not receive instructions to do so, suggesting that my perspective
taking manipulation did not have the intended effect. This finding is unexpected and may
be due to differences in the individual perspective taking abilities of my participants
(Davis 1983). It appears that prompting auditors to engage in perspective taking is not
sufficient to result in actual engagement in perspective taking, at least for the task
employed in my study. This finding is inconsistent with psychology studies, which have
successfully manipulated perspective taking using wording similar to the PT Instructions
manipulation used in this study. Because my perspective taking manipulation was not
successful, I rely on the PT Engagement measure to test my hypotheses. The PT
Engagement measure is a more appropriate way of analyzing the effects of perspective
taking in my study since it is critical that participants are using the appropriate mindset
(i.e., considering the perspective of the client manager) if the benefits of perspective
taking are expected to be obtained. I do provide results related to the effect of the PT
Instructions manipulation on auditors’ misstatement intentionality judgments (although
not significant) for descriptive purposes.
4.2 RESULTS USING THE MANIPULATED PERSPECTIVE TAKING INSTRUCTIONS VARIABLE
Consistent with an ineffective manipulation of perspective taking, I find that
receiving PT Instructions does not influence auditors’ assessments of a misstatement’s
intentionality in the manner predicted by H1. Panel A of Table 4.1 provides descriptive
statistics for auditors’ misstatement intentionality assessments and Panel B provides
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ANOVA results.16 The interaction between PT Instructions and Fraud Risk is not
significant (F = 0.98, p = 0.327).17 The only significant effect in the model is the main
effect for Fraud Risk (F = 13.98, p < 0.001). Tests of simple effects (untabulated) show
that auditors’ misstatement intentionality assessments were significantly higher in the
High Risk versus the Low Risk condition regardless of whether PT Instructions were
Present (LS means 5.75 and 4.39, F = 3.51, p = 0.033, one-tailed) or Absent (LS means
6.23 and 3.89, F = 12.11, p < 0.001, one-tailed). Because of the failed perspective taking
manipulation, it is unclear from these results whether the misstatement intentionality
assessments of auditors who actively engaged in perspective taking are driving the
significant difference between the High Risk and Low Risk condition. Thus, to separate
the effects of auditors who actively considered the manager’s perspective from those who
did not, I test my hypotheses using the PT Engagement measure.18
4.3 RESULTS USING THE MEASURED PERSPECTIVE TAKING ENGAGEMENT VARIABLE
4.3.1 CONTROL VARIABLES
To help rule out the alternative explanation that the PT Engagement measure is
capturing participants’ level of effort or experience, I include three control variables in all
of the analyses that use PT Engagement as an independent variable (i.e., in all tests of
hypotheses and supplemental analyses). Two of the control variables, Total Facts and
16

For analyzing the effect of the PT Instructions manipulation, the eight participants (9.8%) who failed the
PT Instructions manipulation check question are excluded. Results are qualitatively unchanged when all
participants are included in the analysis.
17

All reported p-values throughout the paper are two-tailed unless otherwise noted.

18

H2, H3a and H3b test the process through which perspective taking affects misstatement intentionality
assessments. Because I do not find an effect of PT Instructions on assessments of misstatement
intentionality, I do not report results for H2, H3a and H3b. Instead, these hypotheses are tested using the PT
Engagement measure.
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Time, proxy for participant effort in the experimental task, and Auditor Level proxies for
general audit experience. Table 4.2 provides descriptive statistics for the control
variables. Total Facts represents the number of case facts included by participants when
asked to explain the factors they considered while evaluating the misstatement.19 Because
the Total Facts measure is based on the same open-ended response used to measure PT
Engagement, it controls for the amount of information included by participants. Time
represents the number of minutes participants spent on the experimental task.20 Finally,
Auditor Level represents the participant’s experience level (manager, senior manager or
partner) within the audit firm.21
4.3.2 TEST OF H1
H1 predicts that when the factors surrounding a misstatement are indicative of
higher (lower) fraud risk, auditors who engage in perspective taking will assess the

19

I chose to use the number of facts included by participants rather than the number of words because
perspective taking has been found to foster information elaboration (Hoever et al. 2012). Thus, I would
expect that when auditors engage in perspective taking, they will elaborate to a greater extent about the
manager’s thoughts, feelings, interpretations, etc., resulting in a greater number of words.
20

Three participants were eliminated because they did not indicate their time on the paper-based instrument
and seven additional participants were eliminated because their Time indicated that they had not completed
the experiment in one sitting. Because some measures are memory-based, participants were instructed to
complete the study in one sitting. Results are qualitatively unchanged when these participants are included
in the analyses.
21

Results are qualitatively unchanged when additional control variables are included in the analyses.
Because one firm did not provide full demographic data, the additional control variables utilize a reduced
sample of 56 participants. The additional control variables include years of audit experience (in place of the
auditor level control variable), number of frauds encountered in the last three years, and a measure of how
often participants are responsible for evaluating the intentionality of misstatements on their audit teams
(i.e., task experience), which was measured using an 11-point scale with endpoints labeled “0 – Never” and
“10 – Always.” Additionally, all analyses were run while controlling for the interaction of each control
variable (Total Facts, Time and Auditor Level) with the Fraud Risk variable. None of the interactions were
significant in any of the models. Furthermore, all hypotheses are still supported when the interactions are
included in the analyses. Thus, for simplicity, the final analyses do not include the control variable*fraud
risk interactions.
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likelihood that the misstatement is intentional higher (lower) than auditors who do not
use perspective taking. Panel A of Table 4.3 provides descriptive statistics and Panel B
provides the results of an ANCOVA that includes PT Engagement and Fraud Risk as the
independent variables as well as the three control variables. The ANCOVA table shows a
significant interaction between PT Engagement and Fraud Risk on misstatement
intentionality assessments (F = 4.72, p = 0.034), which provides initial support for H1.
Because I expect a particular pattern of cell means, consistent with Panel A of
Figure 2.1, I use a series of planned comparisons as my primary test of H1. Panel C
reports the planned comparisons. I find that in the High Risk condition, misstatement
intentionality assessments are significantly higher for auditors High in PT Engagement
(LS mean 6.50) versus Low in PT Engagement (LS mean 3.82) (F = 12.59, p = 0.001). In
the Low Risk condition, I do not find a significant difference between the assessments of
auditors considered High versus Low in PT Engagement (4.29 and 4.03, respectively) (F
= 0.13, p = 0.724). The null finding in the Low Risk condition might be due to a floor
effect if the identification of a misstatement always results in auditors having a certain
level of skepticism. Finally, I find that auditors High in PT Engagement assess
misstatement intentionality significantly higher in the High versus Low Risk condition
(LS means 6.50 and 4.29, respectively) (F = 9.03, p = 0.004). Conversely, auditors Low
in PT Engagement do not assess misstatement intentionality differently when Fraud Risk
is High (3.82) versus Low (4.03) (F = 0.07, p = 0.796). Thus, the auditors who engaged
in perspective taking appear to be more sensitive to the differing levels of fraud risk
indicated by the circumstances surrounding the misstatement. Panel B of Figure 2.1
depicts the resulting divergent interaction, which supports H1.
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Overall, these findings suggest that an auditor’s assessment of a misstatement’s
intentionality is no different when the misstatement is surrounded by factors indicative of
high versus low fraud risk, unless the auditor considers the perspective of the manager
responsible for the misstatement. Furthermore, it appears that perspective taking is
particularly helpful for recognizing when a misstatement is at a higher risk of being
intentional, given that perspective taking had the greatest effect on misstatement
intentionality assessments in the High Risk condition.
4.3.3 TEST OF H2
H2 predicts that auditors who engage in perspective taking will list a greater
number of manager-specific fraud risk factors than auditors who do not engage in
perspective taking.22 Panel A of Table 4.4 provides descriptive statistics on the mean
number of manager-specific fraud risk factors listed by participants. ANCOVA results in
Panel B show a significant main effect for PT Engagement (F = 17.33, p < 0.001), which
provides support for H2. Simple effects are presented in Panel C. I find that in the High
Risk condition, auditors High in PT Engagement listed an average of 2.61 managerspecific fraud risk factors, which is significantly higher than the 1.41 listed by auditors
Low in PT Engagement (F = 17.77, p < 0.001). In the Low Risk condition, the number of

22

The coding scheme for the PT Engagement measure was not based on whether participants identified
manager-specific fraud risk factors, but rather whether participants actively considered the manager’s
perspective. Participants who discussed manager-specific fraud risk factors (i.e., facts that influenced the
incentive or opportunity for the manager to intentionally misstate) without mentioning what the manager
might have thought or felt about those circumstances were coded as Low in PT Engagement (see Figure 3.1
for examples). Thus, the PT Engagement coding scheme does not ensure support for H2. Furthermore, 32
of the 35 participants coded Low in PT Engagement (91.4%) listed at least one manager-specific fraud risk
factor, which indicates that risk factor identification does not ensure perspective taking.
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manager-specific fraud risk factors listed by auditors High in PT Engagement (2.09) is
not significantly higher than those Low in PT Engagement (1.67) (F = 2.13, p = 0.149).23
These findings provide support for the theory that perspective taking increases the
salience of the existing circumstances that might have influenced a manager’s intentions
to misstate. The finding that auditors recalled roughly the same number of Total Facts
regardless of condition (see Table 4.2) suggests that perspective taking resulted in
increased attention to manager-specific fraud risk factors, not simply increased attention
to case facts in general. Thus by engaging in perspective taking, auditors appear to be
more sensitive to the fraud risk factors that indicate a manager who caused a
misstatement had an incentive and opportunity to do so intentionally.
4.3.4 TEST OF H3A AND H3B
H3a and H3b predict that when the factors surrounding a misstatement are
indicative of higher (lower) fraud risk, auditors who engage in perspective taking will
recognize that the manager has a higher (lower) incentive and opportunity for fraud.
Panel A of Table 4.5 provides separate sets of descriptive statistics for auditors’ incentive
and opportunity assessments. Panel B displays the ANCOVA models for each dependent
variable. I find that the interaction between PT Engagement and Fraud Risk is marginally
significant for auditors’ incentive assessments (F = 3.56, p = 0.064), but is not significant

23

Recall that the extent to which the manager-specific fraud risk factors increased or decreased fraud risk
varied depending on whether participants were in the High Risk or Low Risk condition. Therefore, I
analyzed whether participants discussed the manager-specific fraud risk factors as increasing fraud risk,
decreasing fraud risk, or did not specify (i.e., remained neutral). I find that in the High Risk condition,
auditors who were considered High (Low) in PT Engagement discussed 95.3% (56.5%) of the managerspecific fraud risk factors listed as increasing fraud risk, 0% (17.4%) as decreasing fraud risk, and 4.7%
(26.1%) as neutral. In the Low Risk condition, auditors who were considered High (Low) in PT
Engagement discussed 39.4% (16.2%) of manager-specific fraud risk factors as increasing fraud risk,
48.5% (29.7%) as decreasing fraud risk, and 12.1% (54.1%) as neutral
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for opportunity assessments (F = 2.06, p = 0.156). Because I expect the same pattern of
cell means as was predicted for H1 (see Panel A of Figure 2.1), I use a series of planned
comparisons as the primary test of H3a and H3b. The results of the planned comparisons
are reported in Panel C.
The planned comparisons related to auditors’ incentive assessments suggest that
the marginally significant interaction between PT Engagement and Fraud Risk is largely
driven by the High Risk condition. In the High Risk condition, auditors High in PT
Engagement assess the manager’s incentive for fraud to be significantly higher (LS mean
7.57) than auditors Low in PT Engagement (LS mean 4.68) (F = 14.09, p < 0.001). I do
not find a significant effect of PT Engagement on incentive assessments in the Low Risk
condition (F = 0.95, p = 0.332). Finally, consistent with H3a, I find that auditors High in
PT Engagement assess the manager’s incentive to be significantly higher in the High
Risk (LS mean 7.57) versus the Low Risk condition (LS mean 4.20) (F = 20.40, p <
0.001), while the difference between High and Low Risk is not significant for auditors
Low in PT Engagement (F = 2.34, p = 0.131). Thus, when the circumstances surrounding
a misstatement suggest that the responsible manager may have benefited from its
occurrence, auditors who engage in perspective taking appear to recognize the manager’s
increased incentive for fraud.
Although I did not find a significant interaction between PT Engagement and
Fraud Risk on auditors’ opportunity assessments, the planned comparisons do provide
some support for H3b. Consistent with H3b, I find that in the Low Risk condition,
auditors High in PT Engagement assess the manager’s opportunity for fraud to be
significantly lower (LS mean 5.16) than auditors Low in PT Engagement (LS mean 6.31)
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(F = 3.02, p = 0.044, one-tailed). I do not find a significant effect of PT Engagement in
the High Risk condition (F = 0.13, p = 0.717). Finally, consistent with the divergent
interaction that is predicted by H3b, I find that auditors High in PT Engagement assess
the manager’s opportunity for fraud to be significantly higher in the High Risk (LS mean
7.56) compared to the Low Risk condition (5.16) (F = 13.99, p < 0.001). Conversely, the
difference between the High and Low Risk conditions is not significant for auditors Low
in PT Engagement (F = 2.08, p = 0.154).
Overall, the findings related to H3a and H3b suggest that by considering the
manager’s perspective, auditors are more sensitive to the extent to which existing
circumstances provide the manager with a direct incentive and opportunity for fraud.
Auditors assessed the manager’s incentive and opportunity to be significantly greater in
the presence of circumstances indicative of high versus low fraud risk, but only when
they had considered the manager’s perspective.
4.4 SUPPLEMENTAL ANALYSIS: AUDITORS’ FOLLOW-UP JUDGMENTS AND PROCEDURES
I performed a supplemental analysis to determine whether auditors who engage in
perspective taking not only assess the risk that a misstatement is intentional more in line
with the risk factors that are present, but also respond in appropriate ways. Table 4.6
presents the results of this analysis, which used Tukey’s multiple comparisons procedure
for each auditor judgment/procedure. According to the auditing standards, believing that
a misstatement might be intentional should impact auditors’ assessments of fraud risk,
materiality and management’s integrity (SEC 1999; AICPA 2002; PCAOB 2010a). 24 I
24

Fraud Risk (Materiality) Assessments were collected on an 11-point scale with endpoints labeled “0 –
Very Low (Immaterial)” and “10 – Very High (Material).” Integrity Assessment measures participants’
assessment of the integrity/ethicality of the manager who caused the misstatement and was collected on an
11-point scale with endpoints labeled “0 – Not At All Ethical” and “10 – Very Ethical.”
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find that auditors High in PT Engagement assessed the overall level of fraud risk
significantly higher in the High Risk condition (LS mean 6.26) compared to the Low
Risk condition (LS mean 4.44) (p = 0.012). They also assessed the materiality level of the
misstatement significantly higher in the High Risk (4.09) versus Low Risk condition
(1.54) (p = 0.005). Conversely, the fraud risk and materiality assessments of auditors
Low in PT Engagement are not significantly different between Fraud Risk conditions (p
= 0.075 for fraud risk and p = 0.302 for materiality). I find no differences between any of
my experimental conditions for auditors’ assessment of the manager’s integrity (all pvalues > 0.100).
Finally, I asked participants to indicate the likelihood of performing various
procedures to further investigate for fraud, suggested by auditing standards and prior
literature (SEC 1999; Asare and Wright 2004; PCAOB 2010a; Hammersley et al. 2011). I
find that for each of these procedures, auditors High in PT Engagement were significantly
more likely to enact the procedure in the High Risk versus the Low Risk condition. These
follow-up procedures include investigating further for fraud (LS means 6.77 and 5.20, p =
0.003), increasing testing procedures (6.47 and 5.08, p = 0.040), communicating concerns
to client management (5.38 and 3.16, p = 0.002), communicating concerns to the audit
committee (4.61 and 2.49, p = 0.001), and consulting with a forensic specialist (4.65 and
2.78, p = 0.004). For auditors Low in PT Engagement, I find no significant differences in
the likelihood of performing these procedures between the High and Low Risk conditions
(all p-values > 0.200). These results suggest that auditors who engage in perspective
taking are more likely to investigate an identified misstatement further for evidence of
fraud when the circumstances surrounding it are indicative of high versus low fraud risk.
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TABLE 4.1: EFFECT OF PERSPECTIVE TAKING INSTRUCTIONS AND FRAUD
RISK ON MISSTATEMENT INTENTIONALITY ASSESSMENTS
PANEL A: Least Squares Mean (Standard Deviation) of Misstatement Intentionality
Assessmentsa
PT Instructions – Present
Low Risk
High Risk
__( n = 18)__
__( n = 16)__
4.39
5.75
(2.57)
(2.17)

PT Instructions - Absent
Low Risk
High Risk
__( n = 18)__
__( n = 22)__
3.89
6.23
(2.00)
(1.77)

PANEL B: ANOVA Table – Misstatement Intentionality Assessments
_______Source_______
PT Instructions
Fraud Risk
PT Instructions*Fraud Risk
Error

_df_
1
1
1
70

_SS_
0.002
62.48
4.36
312.92

_F_
0.00
13.98
0.98

p-value
0.982
<0.001
0.327

_______________________________________
Note: All p-values are two-tailed.
a
Assessments of Misstatement Intentionality were measured by asking participants to
indicate the likelihood that an identified misstatement is or might be intentional using an
11-point scale with endpoints labeled “0 – Not at all Likely” and “10 – Very Likely.”

_____________________________________________________________
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TABLE 4.2: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS – MEAN MEDIAN (STANDARD
DEVIATION) OF EFFORT AND EXPERIENCE CONTROL VARIABLES

Total Factsa

PT Engagement - High
Low Risk
High Risk
__( n = 14)__ __( n = 23)__
3.57
3.57
3.50
3.00
(1.91)
(1.31)

PT Engagement - Low
Low Risk
High Risk
__( n = 21)__ _( n = 14)__
3.48
3.36
4.00
3.00
(1.54)
(1.60)

Timeb

24.60
19.50
(18.94)

18.77
15.78
(8.47)

16.68
15.58
(10.06)

27.39
22.25
(16.09)

Auditor Levelc

2.71
(0.47)

2.78
(0.52)

2.52
(0.51)

2.86
(0.36)

_______________________________________
Note: Table 4.2 provides descriptive statistics related to the three control variables that
are included in all statistical tests using the PT Engagement measure. These covariates
are used to control for auditor effort in the experimental task and auditor experience.
a
Total Facts (a proxy for effort) is the total number of case facts included by participants
when asked to explain the information used to assess misstatement intentionality.
b
Time (a proxy for effort) is the average number of minutes spent on the study.
c
Auditor Level is an indicator variable where 1 represents a senior-level auditor, 2
represents a manager-level auditor, 3 represents a senior manager-level auditor, and 4
represents a partner-level auditor.
________________________________________________________________________
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TABLE 4.3: EFFECT OF PERSPECTIVE TAKING ENGAGEMENT AND FRAUD
RISK ON MISSTATEMENT INTENTIONALITY ASSESSMENTS
PANEL A: Least Squares Mean (Standard Deviation) of Misstatement Intentionality
Assessmentsa
PT Engagement – High
Low Risk
High Risk
__( n = 14)__
__( n = 23)__
4.29
6.50
(1.61)
(2.17)

PT Engagement - Low
Low Risk
High Risk
__( n = 21)__
__( n = 14)__
4.03
3.82
(2.43)
(2.24)

PANEL B: ANCOVA Table – Misstatement Intentionality Assessments
_______Source_______
PT Engagement
Fraud Risk
PT Engagement*Fraud Risk
Total Facts
Time
Auditor Level
Error

_df_
1
1
1
1
1
2
64

_SS_
36.59
16.00
21.12
9.34
8.63
2.30
286.32

_F_
8.18
3.58
4.72
2.09
1.93
0.26

p-value
0.006
0.063
0.034
0.153
0.170
0.774

F
12.59
0.13
9.03
0.07

p-value
0.001
0.724
0.004
0.796

PANEL C: Planned Comparisons
______________Comparison______________
High Risk: High PT Engagement > Low PT Engagement
Low Risk: High PT Engagement < Low PT Engagement
High PT Engagement: High Risk > Low Risk
Low PT Engagement: High Risk = Low Risk

_______________________________________
Note: All p-values are two-tailed and all analyses include the control variables from
Table 4.2.
a
Assessments of Misstatement Intentionality were measured by asking participants to
indicate the likelihood that an identified misstatement is or might be intentional using an
11-point scale with endpoints labeled “0 – Not at all Likely” and “10 – Very Likely.”
________________________________________________________________________
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TABLE 4.4: EFFECT OF PERSPECTIVE TAKING ENGAGEMENT ON ATTENTION
TO MANAGER-SPECIFIC FRAUD RISK FACTORS
PANEL A: Least Squares Mean (Standard Deviation) of Auditor Attention to ManagerSpecific Fraud Risk Factorsa
PT Engagement - High
Low Risk
High Risk
Total
_( n = 14)_
_( n = 23)_ _(n = 37)_
2.09
2.61
2.35
(1.13)
(1.11)
(1.08)

PT Engagement - Low
Low Risk
High Risk
Total
_( n = 21)_ _( n = 14)_ _(n = 35)_
1.67
1.41
1.54
(0.94)
(1.15)
(1.02)

PANEL B: ANCOVA Table – Attention to Manager-Specific Fraud Risk Factors
_______Source_______
PT Engagement
Fraud Risk
PT Engagement*Fraud Risk
Total Facts
Time
Auditor Level
Error

_df_
1
1
1
1
1
2
64

_SS_
11.10
0.024
2.23
26.40
1.43
0.87
40.98

_F_
17.33
0.39
3.50
41.23
2.24
0.68

p-value
<0.001
0.537
0.066
<0.001
0.140
0.510

PANEL C: Planned Comparisons
______________Comparison______________
High Risk: High PT Engagement > Low PT Engagement
Low Risk: High PT Engagement > Low PT Engagement

F
17.77
2.13

p-value
<0.001
0.149

_______________________________________
Note: All p-values are two-tailed and all analyses include the control variables from
Table 4.2.
a
Attention to Manager-Specific Fraud Risk Factors was measured as the number of fraud
risk factors listed by participants related to the incentives and opportunities of the
manager responsible for the misstatement. The maximum number of items that
participants could have listed for this measure was six.

_____________________________________________________________
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TABLE 4.5: EFFECT OF PERSPECTIVE TAKING ENGAGEMENT AND FRAUD
RISK ON INCENTIVE AND OPPORTUNITY ASSESSMENTS
PANEL A: Least Squares Mean (Standard Deviation) of Incentive and Opportunity
Assessmentsa

Incentive
Opportunity

PT Engagement - High
Low Risk
High Risk
__( n = 15)__ __( n = 27)__
4.20
7.57
(2.40)
(1.57)
5.16
(1.86)

PT Engagement - Low
Low Risk
High Risk
__( n = 25)__ __( n = 15)__
3.44
4.68
(2.26)
(2.72)

7.56
(2.15)

6.31
(1.60)

7.32
(1.66)

PANEL B: ANCOVA Tables – Incentive Assessment and Opportunity Assessment
Dependent
Variable___
Incentive

Opportunity

___Source___________
PT Engagement
Fraud Risk
PT Engagement*Fraud Risk
Total Facts
Time
Auditor Level
Error

_df_
1
1
1
1
1
2
64

_SS_
56.06
85.77
16.58
22.93
15.25
1.37
298.12

_F_
12.04
18.41
3.56
4.92
3.27
0.15

p-value
0.001
<0.001
0.064
0.030
0.075
0.864

PT Engagement
Fraud Risk
PT Engagement*Fraud Risk
Total Facts
Time
Auditor Level
Error

1
1
1
1
1
2
64

3.50
46.35
7.04
4.86
2.56
10.75
218.36

1.03
13.58
2.06
1.42
0.75
1.58

0.315
0.001
0.156
0.237
0.390
0.215

_______________________________________
Note: All p-values are two-tailed and all analyses include the control variables from
Table 4.2.
a
Assessments of the manager’s incentive (opportunity) were measured on an 11-point
scale with endpoints labeled 0 – No Incentive (Opportunity) and 10 – Strong Incentive
(Opportunity).
________________________________________________________________________
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TABLE 4.5 (CONTINUED)
PANEL C: Planned Comparisons
Dependent
Variable____
Incentive

Opportunity

____________Comparison_______________
High Risk: PT Engagement High > Low
Low Risk: PT Engagement High < Low
High PT Engagement: High Risk > Low Risk
Low PT Engagement: High Risk = Low Risk

_F_
14.09
0.95
20.40
2.34

p-value
<0.001
0.332
<0.001
0.131

High Risk: PT Engagement High > Low
Low Risk: PT Engagement High < Low
High PT Engagement: High Risk > Low Risk
Low PT Engagement: High Risk = Low Risk

0.13
3.02
13.99
2.08

0.717
0.087
<0.001
0.154

_______________________________________
Note: All p-values are two-tailed and all analyses include the control variables from
Table 4.2.
________________________________________________________________________
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TABLE 4.6: SUPPLEMENTAL ANALYSIS: LEAST SQUARES MEAN (STANDARD
DEVIATION) OF SUBSEQUENT AUDIT JUDGMENTS AND PROCEDURES

_Assessment/Procedure_
Fraud Risk Assessment

PT Engagement - High
Low Risk
High Risk
_( n = 14)_
_( n = 23)_
4.44 a
6.26 a
(1.69)
(1.53)

PT Engagement - Low
Low Risk
High Risk
_( n = 21)_ _( n = 14)_
4.05
5.58
(1.33)
(2.15)

Materiality Assessment

1.54 a
(1.53)

4.09 a b
(2.47)

2.96
(2.05)

1.55 b
(2.10)

Integrity Assessment

4.93
(1.44)

4.33
(1.65)

5.35
(1.47)

5.33
(0.94)

Investigate Further for
Presence of Fraud

5.20 a
(1.67)

6.77 a
(0.42)

5.46
(1.75)

6.30
(0.65)

Increase Testing of
Cash Disbursements

5.08 a
(2.15)

6.47 a
(0.95)

5.80
(1.69)

6.32
(1.01)

Communicate Concerns
to Client Management

3.16 a
(1.50)

5.38 a
(1.50)

3.50
(1.74)

4.44
(1.82)

Communicate Concerns
to Audit Committee

2.49 a
(1.53)

4.61 a
(1.50)

2.69
(1.67)

3.46
(1.31)

Consult with Forensic
Specialist

2.78 a
(1.07)

4.65 a
(1.96)

3.80
(1.69)

3.43
(1.03)

________________________________________
Note: This table provides descriptive statistics regarding subsequent audit judgments and
planned procedures indicated by participants after having assessed misstatement
intentionality. Fraud Risk (Materiality) Assessments were collected on an 11-point scale
with endpoints labeled “0 – Very Low (Immaterial)” and “10 – Very High (Material).”
Integrity Assessment measures participants’ assessment of the integrity/ethicality of the
manager who caused the misstatement and was collected on an 11-point scale with
endpoints labeled “0 – Not At All Ethical” and “10 – Very Ethical.” The remaining
subsequent audit procedures were collected on 7-point likelihood scales with endpoints
labeled “Very Unlikely” and “Very Likely.”
a,b
For each audit assessment/procedure, superscripts of the same letter indicate that the
means are different at p < 0.05 (two-tailed). All other comparisons are not significant at p
< 0.05. All analyses include the control variables from Table 4.2.
________________________________________________________________________
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CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Fraud detection continues to be an important consideration for auditors. A failure
to detect fraud has serious consequences for both the audit firm and the larger public
(Palmrose 1987; Bonner et al. 1998; Beasley et al. 2010). As such, it is important that
auditors continue to improve their fraud detection skills. In the present study, I examined
whether considering the perspective of the manager responsible for a misstatement’s
occurrence influences auditors’ sensitivity to the level of fraud risk surrounding the
misstatement and the resulting belief that the misstatement was intentional.
The results of the present study suggest that by engaging in perspective taking,
auditors are more likely to recognize when the circumstances surrounding an identified
misstatement suggest that it was caused intentionally. Consistent with psychology theory
related to perspective taking, I find that auditors who considered the manager’s
perspective, compared to those who did not, gave more attention to the circumstances
that might have influenced the manager’s actions (i.e., manager-specific fraud risk
factors). Furthermore, auditors who engaged in perspective taking recognized the
manager’s increased incentive to misstate in the high fraud risk condition, relative to the
low fraud risk condition. Most importantly, I find that when the circumstances
surrounding a misstatement were indicative of high fraud risk, auditors who engaged in
perspective taking assessed misstatement intentionality higher than those who did not use
perspective taking. Conversely, the assessments of auditors who did not engage in
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perspective taking were no different when factors surrounding a misstatement were
indicative of high or low fraud risk. The implications of failing to recognize the level of
fraud risk surrounding an identified misstatement are that auditors may not investigate a
misstatement further when doing so might be warranted by the circumstances.
There are some limitations to the present study. First, the use of perspective
taking relies on the evaluation of fraud risk factors that are observable to the auditor. To
the extent that a manager’s fraudulent intentions are influenced by factors that are
unobservable to the auditor (e.g., personal financial troubles), the utility of perspective
taking might be reduced. Second, the study uses a specific misstatement scenario as well
as a specific type of misstatement (a known misstatement/understatement of expenses);
therefore, some caution must be used when generalizing the results. Finally, it appears
that simply instructing auditors to think from the manager’s perspective is not sufficient. I
find that receiving perspective taking instructions had no effect on auditors’ misstatement
intentionality assessments. Furthermore, participants who received perspective taking
instructions were no more likely to actively engage in perspective taking than those who
did not receive such instructions.
Although the present study cannot determine what caused some auditors to
engage in perspective taking or what prevented others from doing so, there are some
potential explanations. First, in the absence of perspective taking instructions, auditors
were told to evaluate the misstatement’s intentionality “as they normally would in
practice.” It would appear that for some auditors, their normal evaluation process already
involves considering the perspective of the responsible manager, since some auditors
engaged in perspective taking naturally. Perspective taking is considered to be a social
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skill that is improved over time through direct perspective taking experience (Iannotti
1978; Chalmers and Townsend 1990). Thus, the more auditors have considered the
perspective of management in practice, the easier and more successful the perspective
taking process theoretically should be. Based on this reasoning, audit firms may want to
consider including tasks within firm trainings that involve the consideration of a client
manager’s perspective to provide auditors with increased perspective taking experience.
Second, prior studies in psychology suggest that people have varying levels of
dispositional perspective taking abilities (e.g., Davis 1983). Therefore, it is possible that
the auditors who were prompted to use perspective taking, but did not, may not have been
able to discard their own perspective to take on the perspective of the manager.
Conversely, the auditors who spontaneously considered the manager’s perspective may
possess a greater dispositional perspective taking ability. Future research can explore
whether individual differences in perspective taking abilities influence how well auditors
perform in fraud detection tasks and whether training may help those who tend not to
consider the perspectives of others naturally. Determining what causes some auditors to
engage in perspective taking and/or what prevents others from doing so is largely a
question for future research to explore. Approximately half of the auditors in the present
study considered the manager’s perspective, suggesting that there is room for
improvement.

45

REFERENCES
Ajzen, I. 1985. From intentions to action: A theory of planned behavior. In J. Kuhl & J.
Beckman (Eds.), Action control: From cognitions to behaviors (pp. 11-39). New
York, NY: Springer.
Ajzen, I. 1991. The theory of planned behavior. Organizational Behavior and Human
Decision Processes 50: 179-211.
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA). 2002. Consideration of
Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit. Statement on Auditing Standards No. 99.
New York, NY: AICPA.
Asare, S.K. and A.M. Wright. 2004. The effectiveness of alternative risk assessment and
program planning tools in a fraud setting. Contemporary Accounting Research
21 (2): 325-352.
Batson, D.C. 2009. Two forms of perspective taking: Imagining how another feels and
imagining how you would feel. In Markman, K.D., W.M.P. Klein, and J.A. Suhr
(Eds.), The handbook of imagination and mental simulation (pp. 267-279), New
York, NY: Psychology Press.
Beasley, M.S., J.V. Carcello, D.R. Hermanson, and T.L. Neal. 2010. Fraudulent financial
reporting 1998 – 2007, An analysis of U.S. public companies. New York, NY:
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission.
Bonner, S., Z.V. Palmrose, and S. Young. 1998. Fraud type and auditor litigation: An
analysis of SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases. The Accounting
Review 73 (4): 503-532.
Bowlin, K. 2011. Risk-based auditing, strategic prompts, and auditor sensitivity to the
strategic risk of fraud. The Accounting Review 86 (4): 1231-1253.
Braun, R.L. 2000. The effect of time pressure on auditor attention to qualitative aspects
of misstatements indicative of potential fraudulent financial reporting.
Accounting, Organizations and Society 25: 243-259.
Carcello, J.V. and D.R. Hermanson. 2008. Fraudulent financial reporting: How do we
close the knowledge gap? Working paper.

46

Carpenter, T.D. 2007. Audit team brainstorming, fraud risk identification, and fraud risk
assessment: Implications of SAS No. 99. The Accounting Review 82 (5): 11191140.
Carpenter, T.D. and J.L. Reimers. 2005. Unethical and fraudulent financial reporting:
Applying the theory of planned behavior. Journal of Business Ethics 60: 115-129.
Chalmers, J. B., and M. A. Townsend. 1990. The effects of training in social perspective
taking on socially maladjusted girls. Child Development 61:178-190.
Coutu, W. 1951. Role-playing vs. role-taking: An appeal for clarification. American
Sociological Review 16 (2): 180-187.
Davis, M.H. 1983. Measuring individual differences in empathy: Evidence for a
multidimensional approach. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 44 (1):
113-126.
Davis, M.H., L. Conklin, A. Smith, and C. Luce. 1996. Effect of perspective taking on
the cognitive representation of persons: A merging of self and other. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology 70 (4): 713-726.
Einhorn, H.J. and R.M. Hogarth.1986. Judging probable cause. Psychological Bulletin 99
(1): 3-19.
Epley, N. and E.M. Caruso. 2009. Perspective taking: Misstepping into others’ shoes. In
Markman, K.D., W.M.P. Klein, and J.A. Suhr (Eds.), Handbook of imagination
and mental simulation (pp. 295-309) New York, NY: Psychology Press.
Eyal, T., N. Liberman, and Y. Trope. 2008. Judging near and distant virtue and vice.
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 44: 1204-1209.
Eyal, T., M.D. Sagristano, Y. Trope, N. Liberman, and S. Chaiken. 2009. When values
matter: Expressing values in behavioral intentions for the near vs. distant future.
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 45 (1): 35-43.
Fleiss, J.L. 1981. Statistical Methods for Rates and Proportions. 2nd ed. New York, NY:
John Wiley & Sons Inc.
Galinsky, A.D. 2002. Creating and reducing intergroup conflict: The role of perspectivetaking in affecting out-group evaluations. Toward Phenomenology of Groups and
Group Membership 4: 85-113.
Galinsky, A.D. and G.B. Moskowitz. 2000. Perspective-taking: Decreasing stereotype
expression, stereotype accessibility, and in-group favoritism. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology 78 (4): 708-724.

47

Galper, R.E. 1976. Turning observers into actors: Differential causal attributions as a
function of “Empathy”. Journal of Research in Personality 10: 328-335.
Gilbert, D.T. 2002. Inferential correction. In T. Gilovich, D. Griffin, and D. Kahneman
(Eds.), Heuristics and biases: The psychology of intuitive judgment (pp. 167-184).
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Hammersley, J.S. 2006. Pattern identification and industry-specialist auditors. The
Accounting Review 81 (2): 309-336.
Hammersley, J.S. 2011. A review and model of auditor judgments in fraud-related
planning tasks. Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory 30 (4): 101-128.
Hammersley, J.S., E.M. Bamber, and T.D. Carpenter. 2010. The influence of
documentation specificity and priming on auditors’ fraud risk assessments and
evidence evaluation decisions. The Accounting Review 85 (2): 547-571.
Hammersley, J.S., K.M. Johnstone, and K. Kadous. 2011. How do audit seniors respond
to heightened fraud risk? Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 30(3):81-101.
Hoever, I.J., D. van Knippenberg, W.P. van Ginkel, and H.G. Barkema. 2012. Fostering
team creativity: Perspective taking as key to unlocking diversity’s potential.
Journal of Applied Psychology 97 (5): 982-996.
Hoffman, V.B. and M.F. Zimbelman. 2009. Do strategic reasoning and brainstorming
help auditors change their standard audit procedures in response to fraud risk? The
Accounting Review 84 (3): 811-837.
Hurtt, R.K. 2010. Development of a scale to measure professional skepticism. Auditing:
A Journal of Practice and Theory 29 (1): 149-171.
Iannotti, R. J. 1978. Effect of role-taking experiences on role taking, empathy, altruism,
and aggression. Developmental Psychology 14:119-124.
Jones, E.E. and R.E. Nisbett. 1971. The actor and the observer: Divergent perceptions of
the causes of behavior, Morristown, N.J.: General Learning Press.
Koonce, L., N. Seybert, and J. Smith. 2011. Causal reasoning in financial reporting and
voluntary disclosure. Accounting, Organizations and Society 36 (4-5): 209-225.
Landis, J.R. and G.G. Koch. 1977. The measurement of observer agreement for
categorical data. Biometrics 33: 159-174.
Leith, K.P. and R.F. Baumeister. 1998. Empathy, shame, guilt, and narratives of
interpersonal conflicts: Guilt-prone people are better at perspective taking.
Journal of Personality 66 (1): 1-37.
48

Libby, R. 1985. Availability and the generation of hypotheses in analytical review.
Journal of Accounting Research 23 (2): 648-667.
Loebbecke, J.K., M.M. Eining, and J.J. Willingham. 1989. Auditors’ experience with
material irregularities: Frequency, nature, and detectability. Auditing: A Journal
of Practice and Theory 9 (Fall): 1-28.
McPherson Frantz, C. and R. Janoff-Bulman. 2000. Considering both sides: The limits of
perspective taking. Basic and Applied Social Psychology 22 (1): 31-42.
Mallett, R.K., J.R. Huntsinger, S. Sinclair, and J.K. Swim. 2008. Seeing through their
eyes: When majority group members take collective action on behalf of an
outgroup. Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 11 (4): 451-470.
O’Donnell, E. 2004. Use of forward versus backward reasoning during audit analytical
procedures: Evidence from a computerised-process-tracing field study.
Accounting and Finance 44: 75-95.
Palmrose, Z. 1987. Litigation and independent auditors: The role of business failures and
management fraud. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory (Spring): 90-102.
Peytcheva, M., O. Singtokul, and W. Yu. 2012. The effect of role-taking in the auditormanager interaction on financial reporting quality. Working paper, Lehigh
University.
Phillips, F. 1999. Auditor attention to and judgments of aggressive financial reporting.
Journal of Accounting Research 37 (1): 167-189.
Piaget, J. 1932. The moral judgment of the child. London: Kegan, Paul, Trench, Trubner.
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). 2007. Observations on
auditors’ implementation of PCAOB standards relating to auditors’
responsibilities with respect to fraud. Available at:
http://pcaobus.org/Inspections/Documents/2007_01-22_Release_2007-001.pdf.
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). 2010a. Evaluating Audit
Results. Auditing Standard No. 14. New York, NY: PCAOB.
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). 2010b. Identifying and
Assessing Risks of Material Misstatement. Auditing Standard No. 12. New York,
NY: PCAOB.
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). 2012. Staff audit practice alert
no. 10: Maintaining and applying professional skepticism in audits. Available at:
http://pcaobus.org/Standards/QandA/12-04-2012_SAPA_10.pdf

49

Regan, D.T. and J. Totten. 1975. Empathy and attribution: Turning observers into actors.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 32 (5): 850-856.
Rose, J.M. 2007. Attention to evidence of aggressive financial reporting and intentional
misstatement judgments: Effects of experience and trust. Behavioral Research in
Accounting 19: 215-229.
Ross, L. and R.E. Nisbett. 1991. The person and the situation. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Schustak, M. and R. Sternberg. 1981. Evaluation of evidence in causal inference. Journal
of Experimental Psychology: General (March): 101-120.
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 1999. Materiality. SEC Staff Accounting
Bulletin No. 99. (August 12). Washington D.C.: SEC.
Simon, C.A. 2012. Individual auditors’ identification of relevant fraud schemes.
Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory 31 (1): 1-16.
Tan, H. 1995. Effects of expectations, prior involvement, and review awareness on
memory for audit evidence and judgment. Journal of Accounting Research 33:
113-135.
Trotman, K., R. Simnett, and A. Khalifa. 2009. Impact of the type of audit team
discussions on auditors’ generation of material frauds. Contemporary Accounting
Research 26 (4): 1115-1142.
Trotman, K. T., A. Wright, and S. Wright. 2005. Auditor negotiations: An examination of
the efficacy of intervention methods. The Accounting Review 80 (1):349-367.
Waller, W.S. and W.L. Felix. 1989. Auditors’ causal judgments: Effects of forward and
backward inference on information processing. Accounting, Organizations and
Society 14: 179-200.
Wilks, T.J. and M.F. Zimbelman. 2004. Decomposition of fraud-risk assessments and
auditors’ sensitivity to fraud cues. Contemporary Accounting Research 21 (3):
719-745.
Wolfe, D.T. and D.R. Hermanson. 2004. The fraud diamond: Considering the four
elements of fraud. The CPA Journal (December): 38-42.
Zimbelman, M.F. and W.S. Waller. 1999. An experimental investigation of auditorauditee interaction under ambiguity. Journal of Accounting Research 37
(Supplement): 135-155.

50

APPENDIX A: EXCERPTS FROM EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUMENT
The following pages provide excerpts from my experimental instrument, including an
overview of the identified misstatement, followed by the manipulation of perspective
taking instructions and fraud risk.
OVERVIEW OF THE IDENTIFIED MISSTATEMENT
Joe Rogers is the primary individual responsible for purchasing decisions at Green
Division (a division of C&P). The identified misstatement was the result of inaccurate
information provided by Joe Rogers in a Payment Request form. In the form, he
classified a payment being made to a supplier as a prepayment for future purchases. The
payment actually related to a one-time penalty triggered by Green Division’s failure to
purchase the minimum amount of product specified within a Supply Agreement. As a
result of the inaccurate payment classification, the accounting department recorded the
payment as a prepaid asset rather than an expense. The misclassification was not
identified during the review process, in part because Joe Rogers did not include
documentation to support the purpose of the payment. C&P management believes that,
“The payment was incorrectly classified as a prepayment by Joe Rogers because
prepayments are a frequent occurrence with many of our suppliers. However, we rarely
incur a penalty for missing a minimum purchasing target. As such, in filling out the
Payment Request form, Joe Rogers accidentally selected a prepayment classification
rather than selecting the appropriate expense classification, and unfortunately this
mistake was not caught during the review process.”
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MANIPULATION OF PERSPECTIVE TAKING INSTRUCTIONS (ABSENT VS. PRESENT)
Note: All participants received an excerpt from the audit program. The perspective taking
manipulation appeared within the third step of the audit program, directly following the
instructions to “consider whether each misstatement is or might be intentional.”
Audit Program:
Evaluating Identified Misstatements
1.) Obtain an understanding of the nature and cause of each misstatement.

I have read and
understand the
instructions

2.) Evaluate whether each misstatement is material.
Take into account both quantitative and qualitative materiality factors.
3.) Consider whether each misstatement is or might be intentional.
In considering whether a misstatement might be intentional, evaluate
the facts and circumstances related to the misstatement
Perspective Taking Absent:
…as you normally would in practice.
Perspective Taking Present:
…by using the following evaluation process required by your firm:
Think from the perspective of the client-individual responsible for the
misstatement. Put yourself in the place of this client-individual and try to imagine
what you would think and how you would feel about the act of misstating under
the circumstances faced by the client.
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FRAUD RISK MANIPULATION (HIGH RISK VS. LOW RISK)
Note: The High and Low Risk manipulations were seeded within additional information
provided to participants. The first two manipulations vary the extent to which Joe Rogers
had an incentive to misstate and the final two vary the extent to which he had an
opportunity to misstate.
High Risk
Low Risk
Contract Initiation:
Contract Initiation:
Joe Rogers initiated the Supply
Joe Rogers did not initiate the Supply
Agreement and was responsible for
Agreement and was not responsible for
setting the purchasing targets.
setting the purchasing targets.
Joe Rogers’ Performance Evaluation
Criteria: Manager performance is
evaluated at the end of each year to
determine raises and promotions based on
(1) the manager’s primary job
responsibilities and (2) the operational
performance and overall profitability of
the manager’s division.

Joe Rogers’ Performance Evaluation
Criteria: Manager performance is
evaluated at the end of each year to
determine raises and promotions based on
(1) the manager’s primary job
responsibilities and (2) compliance with
Company policies and proper financial
reporting practices.

Current Year Control Testing:
Testing results revealed that the Corporate
Treasurer normally approves Payment
Requests. However, due to a seven month
leave of absence, the Corporate
Treasurer’s responsibilities were
temporarily assumed by another
individual who was not familiar with the
approval process. During this seven
month period, multiple Payment
Requests were submitted without proper
supporting documentation, including the
one associated with the misstatement.
Thus, multiple Payment Requests were
identified that were improperly approved.
These multiple exceptions indicate that
the approval process was consistently
ineffective throughout most of the year in
rejecting unsupported Payment Requests.
Internal Audit Involvement:
C&P internal audit does not perform
testing at Green Division. Out of the six
divisions of C&P, internal audit
consistently performs testing at the two
largest divisions each year - Houston
Division and Portland Division.

Current Year Control Testing:
Testing results revealed that the Corporate
Treasurer normally approves Payment
Requests. However, due to a one week
leave of absence, the Corporate
Treasurer’s responsibilities were
temporarily assumed by another
individual who was not familiar with the
approval process. During this one week
period, the only Payment Request that
was submitted without proper supporting
documentation was the one associated
with the misstatement. Thus, this is the
only Payment Request identified that
was improperly approved. This isolated
exception indicates that the approval
process was consistently effective
throughout most of the year in rejecting
unsupported Payment Requests.
Internal Audit Involvement:
C&P internal audit periodically perform
testing at Green Division. Out of the six
divisions of C&P, internal audit
consistently performs unannounced
testing at two randomly selected
divisions each year.
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